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https://twitter.com/WhiteHouseHstry/status/1654472077225730048
Russia had long assumed - probably correctly - that the site of Ukrainians charging into Russia would make their Western partners nervous. Kyiv has neatly sidestepped that by using Russian proxy forces instead of Ukrainians.
But regardless, the outcome will be the same - it'll force Russia to re-deploy troops that could have been more productively used in Ukraine to defend these border regions - in the same way Ukraine has had to station thousands of their own soldiers on the Belarusian border.
It also once again undermines one of Putin's main arguments about his "special military operation", that the war was meant to make Russia safer. Before February 2022, there was never any direct conflict with Ukraine on Russian soil; now there is.
The states that use Colorado River water have agreed to cuts requested by the federal government to help keep two of the main reservoirs, Lake Mead and Lake Powell, from falling to critically low levels.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/western-states-reach-agreement-on-colorado-river-cuts-fc178c5c?st=0veeg26ynpfr60h
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/18/business/disney-ron-desantis-florida.html
Disney pulling its investment comes on the heels of an explosive exposé of the Mormon Church's investment practices, as whistleblower allegations accuse the church of funneling non-profit money into private ventures viae a "clandestine hedge fund".
What's also happening in Florida with Disney has everything to do with global Casino interests wanting to open up shop here, and turn our state into a new Las Vegas.
So, Republicans are upset that they got cut off at the tap. But not to worry, the big money in Florida this year is from CASINOS! The top 6 donors are all gambling/casino companies, and statewide gambling contributions total over $200 million according to TransparencyUSA.
https://www.wdwinfo.com/news-stories/disney-has-spent-20-million-to-support-anti-gambling-measure-on-november-ballot/
more here:
https://twitter.com/Matt_Fleming321/status/1526235396581036032
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/16/health/vaccines-public-opinion.html
GONZALEZ: hhttps://www.supremecourt.gov/errors/PageNotFound.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/opinions/22pdf/default.aspx
TAAMNEH: https://www.supremecourt.gov/errors/PageNotFound.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/opinions/22pdf/default.aspx
--- The court’s narrowly focused rulings sidestepped requests to limit a law that protects social media platforms from lawsuits over content posted by their users, even if the platform’s algorithms promote videos that laud terrorist groups. ---
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/18/business/g7-biden-oil-price-cap-russia.html
Jim Tankersley is an economics reporter who covers the White House. He has been tracking the Biden administration’s efforts to limit Russia’s oil revenues for the past year.
In early June, at the behest of the Biden administration, German leaders assembled top economic officials from the Group of 7 nations for a video conference with the goal of striking a major financial blow to Russia.
The Americans had been trying, in a series of one-off conversations last year, to sound out their counterparts in Europe, Canada and Japan on an unusual and untested idea. Administration officials wanted to try to cap the price that Moscow could command for every barrel of oil it sold on the world market. Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen had floated the plan a few weeks earlier at a meeting of finance ministers in Bonn, Germany.
The reception had been mixed, in part because other countries were not sure how serious the administration was about proceeding. But the call in early June left no doubt: American officials said they were committed to the oil price cap idea and urged everyone else to get on board. At the end of the month, the Group of 7 leaders signed on to the concept.
As the Group of 7 prepares to meet again in this week in Hiroshima, Japan, official and market data suggest the untried idea has helped achieve its twin initial goals since the price cap took effect in December. The cap appears to be forcing Russia to sell its oil for less than other major producers, when crude prices are down significantly from their levels immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Data from Russia and international agencies suggest Moscow’s revenues have dropped, forcing budget choices that administration officials say could be starting to hamper its war effort. Drivers in America and elsewhere are paying far less at the gasoline pump than some analysts feared.
Russia’s oil revenues in March were down 43 percent from a year earlier, the International Energy Agency reported last month, even though its total export sales volume had grown. This week, the agency reported that Russian revenues had rebounded slightly but were still down 27 percent from a year ago. The government’s tax receipts from the oil and gas sectors were down by nearly two-thirds from a year ago.
Russian officials have been forced to change how they tax oil production in an apparent bid to make up for some of the lost revenues. They also appear to be spending government money to try to start building their own network of ships, insurance companies and other essentials of the oil trade, an effort that European and American officials say is a clear sign of success.
“The Russian price cap is working, and working extremely well,” Wally Adeyemo, the deputy Treasury secretary, said in an interview. “The money that they’re spending on building up this ecosystem to support their energy trade is money they can’t spend on building missiles or buying tanks. And what we’re going to continue to do is force Russia to have these types of hard choices.”
Some analysts doubt the plan is working nearly as well as administration officials claim, at least when it comes to revenues. They say the most frequently cited data on the prices that Russia receives for its exported oil is unreliable. And they say other data, like customs reports from India, suggests Russian officials may be employing elaborate deception measures to evade the cap and sell crude at prices well above its limit.
“I’m concerned the Biden administration’s desperation to claim victory with the price cap is preventing them from actually acknowledging what isn’t working and taking the steps that might actually help them win,” said Steve Cicala, an energy economist at Tufts University who has written about potential evasion under the cap.
The price cap was invented as an escape hatch to the financial penalties that the United States, Europe and others announced on Russian oil exports in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. Those penalties included bans preventing wealthy democracies from buying Russian oil on the world market. But early in the war, they essentially backfired. They drove up the cost of all oil globally, regardless of where it was produced. The higher prices delivered record exports revenues to Moscow, while driving American gasoline prices above $5 a gallon and contributing to President Biden’s sagging approval rating.
A new round of European sanctions was set to hit Russian oil hard in December. Economists on Wall Street and in the Biden administration warned those penalties could knock oil off the market, sending prices soaring again. So administration officials decided to try to leverage the West’s dominance of the oil shipping trade — including how it is transported and financed — and force a hard bargain on Russia.
Under the plan, Russia could keep selling oil, but if it wanted access to the West’s shipping infrastructure, it had to sell at a sharp discount. In December, European leaders agreed to set the cap at $60 a barrel. They followed with other caps for different types of petroleum products, like diesel.
Many analysts were skeptical it could work. A cap that was too punitive had the potential to encourage Russia to severely restrict how much oil it pumps and sells. Such a move could drive crude prices skyward. Alternatively, a cap that was too permissive might have failed to affect Russian oil sales and revenues at all.
Neither scenario has happened. Russia announced a modest production cut this spring but has mostly kept producing at about the same levels it did when the war began.
Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency, has called the price cap an important “safety valve” and a crucial policy that has forced Russia to sell oil for far less than international benchmark prices. Russian oil now trades for $25 to $35 a barrel less than other oil on the global market, Treasury Department officials estimate.
“Russia played the energy card, and it didn’t win,” Mr. Birol wrote in a February report. “Given that energy is the backbone of Russia’s economy, it’s not surprising that its difficulties in this area are leading to wider problems. Its budget deficit is skyrocketing as military spending and subsidies to its population largely exceed its export income.”
Biden administration officials say that there is no evidence of widespread evasion by Russia, and that Mr. Cicala’s analysis of Indian customs reports does not account for the rising cost of transporting Russian oil to India, which is embedded in the customs data.
There is no dispute that the world has avoided what was privately the largest concern for Biden officials last summer: another round of skyrocketing oil prices.
American drivers were paying about $3.54 a gallon on average for gasoline on Monday. That was down nearly $1 from a year ago, and it is nowhere near the $7 a gallon some administration officials feared if the cap had failed to prevent a second oil shock from the Russian invasion. Gas prices are a mild source of relief for Mr. Biden as high inflation continues to hamper his approval among voters.
After rising sharply in the months surrounding the Russian invasion, global oil prices have fallen back to late-2021 levels. The plunge is partly driven by economic cooling around the world, and it has persisted even as large producers like Saudi Arabia have curtailed production.
Falling global prices have contributed to Russia’s falling revenues, but they are not the whole story. Reported sales prices for exported Russian oil, known as Urals, have dropped by twice as much as the global price for Brent crude.
The Group of 7 leaders meeting in Japan this week will probably not spend much time on the cap, instead turning to other collective efforts to constrict Russia’s economy and revenues. And the biggest winners from the cap decision will not be at the summit.
“The direct beneficiaries are mostly emerging market and lower-income countries that import oil from Russia,” Treasury officials noted in a recent report.
The officials were referring to a handful of countries outside the Group of 7 — particularly India and China — that have used the cap as leverage to pay a discount for Russian oil. Neither India nor China joined the formal cap effort, but it is their oil consumers who are seeing the lowest prices from it.
Jim Tankersley is a White House correspondent with a focus on economic policy. He has written for more than a decade in Washington about the decline of opportunity for American workers, and is the author of "The Riches of This Land: The Untold, True Story of America's Middle Class." @jimtankersley
Israeli security strategy: Stated goal of operations was to degrade Palestinian Islamic Jihad, hammer it so it won’t/can’t fire rockets again in near term. Sure But bigger strategic objective was to restore Israeli deterrence after 5 months of political/social chaos annd increased rocket fire, terror attacks.
Basically to show everyone (Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran etc) Israel is still able and willing to use force even at risk of sustained campaign. IDF will stay united, opposition will support, public won’t be on streets protesting it. Restore deterrence.
Collapse of ‘united front’ thesis: For months we’ve heard of growing ‘ring of fire’ surrounding Israel - Iran and proxies closing in, any escalation will lead to multi-front war. Not only did other fronts stay quiet but couldn’t even get united front *inside* Gaza by way of Hamas & Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
PIJ capabilities: 2nd round of open conflict ALONE vs IDF in 9 months, 3rd in 3.5 yrs. Sustained (albeit sporadic) rocket fire into Israel for number of days despite losing senior leadership. Tellingly- bit less crowing in Israel now re "biggest hit ever" to PIJ, yrs to recover etc.
“War of Attrition” Doctrine: Whether by accident or deliberate choice PIJ introduced ‘war of attrition’ doctrine (“tense quiet”) to Gaza fighting, ie longevity over intensity re rocket fire. Keep south Israel under siege, central Israel on alert for days w/out firing 1 rocket.
Collapse of Israel’s Gaza strategy? Since ~2018 Israel’s strategy is to give economic benefits to Hamas in return for quiet. Hamas as sovereign should guarantee quiet. 4 rounds in 4 yrs now, w the length of time bw them shortening
Israeli politics: Netanyahu (& his govt) had been cratering in polls. Now seeing recovery Rightwing pressure re govt being too “soft” on terror & rockets etc. Ben Gvir was symptom of this, not its cause. Bibi did what rightwing base demanded, pressure relieved...for now.
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WB/Mothers-Families-Work/Lifetime-caregiving-costs_508.pdf
A first-of-its-kind report from the Department of Labor studying women in their early 40s calculated how much they lose as a result of their caregiving responsibilities for children and parents.
https://www.americanoversight.org/investigation/the-constitutional-sheriffs-movement-and-election-denial